The Long Arm of the Law In Ohio

Posted on September 29, 2010 02:21 by Matthew L. Snyder

The Ohio Supreme Court recently held that an Ohio court could exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who allegedly defamed an Ohio corporation via the Internet even though the nonresident had never set foot in Ohio.  See Kauffman Racing Equip., LLC v. Roberts, 126 Ohio St.3d 81, 2010-Ohio-2551, 930 N.E.2d 784 (Ohio 2010).  The defendant, a resident of Virginia, had purchased an engine block from the plaintiff, an Ohio corporation, made his purchase over the Internet, and never was in Ohio.  Claiming a defect, the defendant sent the engine block to the plaintiff for inspection, which returned it to him unrepaired, claiming post-sale modifications had been made to it.  The disgruntled defendant turned to online message boards, writing that the plaintiff “is less than honorable,” and his postings were “not to get a resolution” but that he had “a much bigger and dastardly plan.”  Id. at ¶¶13, 15.  In support of jurisdiction, the plaintiff offered evidence that it had received at least five inquiries from Ohio residents as a result of the defendant’s online postings.

In deciding the case, the Ohio Supreme Court employed the familiar test of determining (1) whether the state’s long-arm statute and civil rules conferred jurisdiction, and, if so, (2) whether the exercise of jurisdiction would deprive the defendant of his right to due process.  As to the first prong of the test, the court held that the allegedly defamatory comments were considered “published” in Ohio because they were viewed by Ohio residents, which meant that the “alleged tort was committed in Ohio,” thus satisfying the long-arm statute and civil rules.  Id. at ¶42 (citing O.R.C. 2307.382(A)(3); Ohio R. Civ. P. 4.3(A)(3)).  Moreover, the first prong is satisfied “[w]hen defamatory statements regarding an Ohio plaintiff are made outside the state yet with the purpose of causing injury to the Ohio resident and there is a reasonable expectation that the purposefully inflicted injury will occur in Ohio.”  Id. at ¶44.

As to the second prong – due process – the court relied most heavily upon the decision of Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984), in which the due process rights of the National Inquirer, a Florida resident, were found not to have been unconstitutionally impinged by California’s exercise of jurisdiction over it after it allegedly had libeled “the professionalism of an entertainer whose television career was centered in California.”  Id. at ¶52.  Jurisdiction was proper because “California [was] the focal point of both the story and the harm suffered.”  Id.  Analogizing to Calder, the Ohio Supreme Court noted that in Roberts “the allegedly defamatory statements were communicated to Ohio residents,” and the plaintiff is “an Ohio-based company whose reputation is centered in Ohio and that had engaged in commercial activity with [the defendant] before the controversy.”  Id. at ¶65 (emphasis in original).  Moreover, the defendant should have foreseen the possibility of being haled into an Ohio court because he “not only knew that [the] Ohio resident . . . could be the victim [of his postings], he intended it be the victim.”  Id. at ¶68.  Finally, the defendant had contacts in Ohio through the purchase of the engine block, and Ohio has an interest in the plaintiff obtaining relief.  Id. at ¶¶70-72.

The court concluded that it would “decline to allow a nonresident defendant to take advantage of the conveniences that modern technology affords and simultaneously be shielded from the consequences of his intentionally tortious conduct.”  Id. at ¶74.  The decision was reached four-to-two with one abstention.  The dissent wrote that due process rights are violated by providing “an avenue for any affected Ohioan to sue the originator of any negative post in an Ohio court when the product has been purchased in Ohio and the negative post is read by an Ohio resident,” and that the effect would be to “chill the exercise of free speech.”  Id. at ¶¶80-81.  Will this decision have lasting ramifications for future cases?  Why or why not?

Bookmark and Share

Categories: State Supreme Court

Actions: E-mail | Comments

 

Proximate cause is an element of all tort cases.  In asbestos cases, a recent decision by the U.S. Sixth Circuit has favorable implications for the issues of causation and take-home exposure.  See Martin v Cincinnati Gas & Elec.Co., No. 07-6485, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 1702 (6th Cir. Jan. 27, 2009). In that case, the plaintiff’s father had worked with underground power lines that contained asbestos during a period from 1951 to 1963.  The plaintiff, who was born in 1952, claimed exposure to asbestos carried home on work clothes his father wore home, as well as from the plaintiff’s own exposure as a welder and mechanic from 1979 to 1984.  The district court, applying Kentucky law, granted summary judgment to GM for lack of substantial factor causation when the plaintiff was a mechanic, and to CG&E and GE, the father’s employer and supplier, for a lack of duty to the plaintiff for the take-home exposure. 

As to causation, the court noted that Kentucky law requires that asbestos exposure from a defendant’s product be a substantial factor in causing the injury. The plaintiff argued that, “because mesothelioma is a progressive disease, any exposure is a substantial cause.” The Sixth Circuit rejected this argument, which has worked in many jurisdictions. The court noted, “[y]et one measure of whether an action is a substantial factor is ‘the number of other factors which contribute in producing the harm and the extent of the effect which they have in producing it.’” Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS  § 433(a)).  Also noting its earlier decision, Lindstrom v. A-C Product Liability Trust, 424 F.3d 488, 493 (6th Cir. 2005), the court observed that to hold “any exposure is a substantial cause” would render the substantial factor test “meaningless.”  Summary judgment thus was upheld on the issue of causation. 

As to take-home liability, whether CG&E and GE owed the plaintiff a duty of care under Kentucky law turned on foreseeability in light of what the defendants knew or should have known at the relevant times.  Specifically, the plaintiff had to show that each defendant “knew or should have known the danger of bystander asbestos exposure” when it provided asbestos-containing products to the defendant’s father.  In cases like this, plaintiffs’ experts rely upon published scientific papers to show that the hazards of asbestos were knowable years before the exposure in a given case, thereby making the danger foreseeable. 

The Sixth Circuit, however, framed the issue under Kentucky law more precisely, finding that Kentucky law imposes upon the defendant a duty to have “knowledge of pertinent matters . . . as a reasonable man would have.”  Id. (citing Pathways, Inc. v. Hammons, 113 S.W.3d 85, 90 (Ky. 2003) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289(a))). This knowledge includes the “capacities of things and forces in so far as they are matters of common knowledge at the time and in the community.” Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289(a)). 1

The plaintiff had no evidence that CG&E or GE had actual knowledge of the danger of take-home exposure during the relevant time periods – 1937 to 1955 when GE supplied asbestos products, 1951 to 1963 when CG&E employed plaintiff’s father. The plaintiff instead tried to prove constructive knowledge through published reports and studies. A 1911 study and subsequent ones in the 1930s only were concerned with neighbors of asbestos factories.  Plaintiff’s expert also opined that there was knowledge of the hazard in the 1950s, but he conceded “that the first studies of bystander exposure were not published until 1965.”  The court concluded that “[w]ithout any published studies or any evidence of industry knowledge of bystander exposure, there is nothing that would justify charging CG&E or GE with such knowledge during the time that Mr. Martin’s father was working with asbestos.”

Beyond the general fact that the Sixth Circuit upheld summary judgment on the issues of causation and take-home exposure, the decision is important to all jurisdictions. It suggests defendants would be well advised to use well-established tort concepts in conjunction with a careful reading of the Restatement in order to bring common sense back into the courtroom.  That approach here lead to an outright rejection of de minimis asbestos exposure as adequate evidence of causation. It also resulted in premises and supplier defendants being relieved of liability to bystanders when there was a complete lack of evidence that a reasonable person would have recognized that harm to bystanders was foreseeable at the time when the exposure occurred.

The outcome reached in Martin was aided by the amicus brief of Mark Behrens, partner at Shook, Hardy & Bacon, on behalf of the Coalition for Litigation Justice and other interested parties. The brief focused on the take-home exposure side of the case, but Mr. Behrens also has contributed to the body of arguments against de minimis exposure, namely an article he recently coauthored with William Anderson – The "Any Exposure" Theory An Unsound Basis for Asbestos Causation and Expert Testimony, 37 S.U. L. REV. 479 (2008).  It finally should be noted that the Martin decision is unpublished but citation is permitted as long as the decision is attached to the brief.  See FRAP 32.1; 6 Cir. R. 28(f). 

Bookmark and Share

Categories: Toxic Tort | Asbestos | Causation

Actions: E-mail | Comments

 
 

Submit Blog

If you wish to submit a blog posting for DRI Today, send an email to today@dri.org with "Blog Post" in the subject line. Please include article title and any tags you would like to use for the post.
 
 
 

Search Blog


Recent Posts

Categories

Authors

Blogroll



Staff Login