Assuming Vermont's GMO labeling law survives a court challenge, beginning in July, 2016, all producers of food products sold in Vermont that contain genetically modified ingredients will be required to label the products as containing GE ingredients (unless the GE component is below 1 percent of the total weight of the product). The label must be “clear and conspicuous” and must be no smaller than the size of the words “Serving Size” on the “Nutrition Facts” label required by federal law.

There will be three (3) labeling options: “Produced with Genetic Engineering”; “Partially Produced with Genetic Engineering”; and “May be Produced with Genetic Engineering.” Producers can use the label “Partially Produced with Genetic Engineering” if the product contains less than 75 percent GE material by weight. Producers can use the label “May be Produced with Genetic Engineering” only if the manufacturer does not know, and cannot reasonably determine in good faith and with due diligence, if the ingredients are genetically engineered. The Vermont Attorney General can determine whether a producer has used good faith in using this option. A producer is exempt from the labeling requirement if it obtains sworn affidavits from its suppliers that the ingredients are not genetically engineered or GMOs.

Retailers who sell raw commodities that contain or are the product of genetic engineering (e.g., raw corn in the produce section at the supermarket) must also label the product at the point of sale.

Producers/retailers are free, if they wish, to include a disclaimer that the U.S. Food and Drug Administration does not consider genetically engineered food to be materially different from non-GE food.

In addition to having to label their products, as described above, producers of food products containing GE ingredients cannot use the word “natural” or words of similar import (e.g., “all natural” or “naturally made”) on the product.

There are significant exceptions to the law. Pure meat and dairy products are completely exempted, as are alcoholic beverages. Food intended for immediate consumption (e.g., restaurant food, deli food, take-out, etc.) is also exempted. Also, food products containing small amounts of GE ingredients that are only used as processing aids do not need to be labeled. Lastly, also exempt are products that have been certified as “organic” or GE-free by an organization acceptable to the Vermont Attorney General (e.g., the Non-GMO Project).

The Vermont Attorney General is empowered to investigate and enforce the law.

Compliance with this law could be extremely challenging for both national and local food producers, for a variety of reasons. For national food producers, compliance with the law could mean: a) labeling ALL of their products nationwide just to comply with the Vermont law, even though Vermont constitutes only a tiny subfraction of the national market share; or b) specially-labeling the package on products intended exclusively for the Vermont market (if it is even feasible to do so), or c) changing their distribution systems to keep non-labeled products out of the Vermont market. Some observers have wondered whether some national producers will simply no longer ship their products into Vermont, rather than create special packaging and distribution just for the tine Vermont market.

For small or local producers, it could be an extreme hardship to: a) determine if their ingredients are genetically engineered, and/or then b) attempt to source only non-GE ingredients for their products. In addition, what if a national producer relabels its product to comply with Vermont law, but then a neighboring state passes a GMO labeling law with different labeling requirements than Vermont's? How many different state-specific packages would a national producer have to make for a single product?

Of course, the constitutionality of the law is currently being challenged in federal court by food manufacturers, and a decision in the lawsuit is pending.


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Categories: Food Safety

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Practice, Practice, Practice

Posted on January 13, 2015 04:44 by Andrew DeSimone

As kids, we heard this all the time, from parents and coaches.  “You will never get any better without practice”: from the piano, to baseball, to gymnastics.  Practice builds muscle memory, and without that practice, without that muscle memory, performers and athletes cannot excel, be it at Carnegie Hall or during March Madness.

As attorneys, our jobs require the same attention to practice, practice, practice.  We need muscle memory to help us through stressful or surprising situations that invariably arise in depositions, at court hearings, or at trial.  How do you conduct a successful voir dire? How do you properly impeach a witness with a deposition?  How do you conduct a Daubert hearing to have plaintiff’s expert excluded at trial?  Without it, trial attorneys confronted with a “surprise” cannot adequately represent their clients.  

In a recent blog post, Chris Bottcher, Chair of the Trial Tactics Committee, discussed the major problem facing litigators today: the lack of exposure to trials and other hearings necessary for attorneys to hone their skills. However, the 2015 Trial Tactics Seminar offers a great opportunity for attorneys of all experience levels to practice, practice, practice their litigation skills. Topics include conducting a Daubert hearing, dealing with surprises at trial, how to conduct a successful voir dire, and many, many others.  

The 2015 Trial Tactics Seminar will be held at Caesar’s Palace Las Vegas, March 18–20, 2015. It happens to be during March Madness. So while you learn from leading trial lawyers across the country to help you build the necessary muscle memory to succeed as a litigator, the top college basketball athletes will be putting their skills to the test after years of practice, practice, practice.  The program will be great. It will be a unique opportunity to learn, connect, and grow. Hope to see you there.  

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Categories: Seminar | Voire Dire

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The Insurance Broker and Dual Agency

Posted on January 12, 2015 08:58 by Marc Zimet

 Insurance brokers and agents know that their respective roles entail unique responsibilities and duties to their clients. Correctly defining an individual as a broker or agent is essential to determining the proper scope of representation and duties owed to the client. This can be difficult where lines are blurred and legally, the determination will depend upon the facts, not how the parties label themselves. Furthermore, it is possible under certain circumstances for an individual to act as both agent and broker. In these cases care must be taken to ensure the broker is meeting its standard of care and ethical considerations are adhered to.

Generally speaking, agency relationships, such as those found in the agent and broker context, arise via contract. While an agency relationship may be oral, in the case of an insurance broker and agent, it should always be in writing to ensure a clear understanding between the parties is documented, as well as to comply with Business and Professions Code.

Typically, brokers are agents of the insurer when it comes to issuing policies, certificates of insurance, collecting premiums, etc. The role of the broker as an agent is generally provided for in the contract between the insurer and broker, as well as the specific circumstances under which the broker has the authority to act as agent.

However, problems may arise where the role of the intermediary is not so clear. For example, where the broker is an agent of the insured, if the insured directs the broker to obtain insurance from a specific insurance company, the broker is also considered to be an agent of the insurer. In situations such as these, the broker may become an agent of the insured for purposes of obtaining coverage, as well as an agent of the insurer for other purposes. Generally speaking, agents are fiduciaries of their principals, owing to their principal the duty of undivided loyalty. One would therefore assume that the dual agency would put the broker in a precarious situation, which is generally not permissible in the realm of agency law. However, in the insurance arena, this dual agency is not always a conflict for the broker.

In California, it has been held that the broker’s duties to the insured do not rise to the level of a fiduciary. A broker need only act with reasonable care. (Workmen’s Auto Insurance Company v. Guy Carpenter & Company, Inc.(2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1468.) Therefore, in California at least, the broker acting as dual agent will not run afoul of principal-agency law. While the courts have declined to impose the fiduciary duty on brokers, the fact of the matter is that under normal circumstances a dual agency in the context of insurance will rarely see a conflict of interest such as that that the prohibition is intended to prevent. This is because the broker’s responsibilities to the insurer and insured are independent of each other. For example, the broker can easily procure insurance for the insured and collect the premium for the insurer without conflict. Once the broker has obtained coverage as requested by the insurer, the agency relationship between the broker and insured terminates, thereby permitting the broker to continue to collect premiums and issue certificates on behalf of the insurer without any potential for conflict.

While brokers may act in a dual agency capacity, care must still be taken to act with reasonable care and prudence, and a broker may still be liable to insureds for failing to meet this standard. 

This blog was originally posted on January 6. Click here to read the original entry. 


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Categories: Insurance Law

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New EU Regulation on Antitrust Damages

Posted on January 9, 2015 02:51 by Ana Flores

The new EU regulation on antitrust damages is in force since the 25th of December 2014; the deadline for the transposition of this Directive is December 27th, 2016. 

It is the first specific regulation on this issue within the EU, thus a big step to reinforce the effectiveness of antitrust regulation by mean of making easier to individuals (consumers and companies, especially SME) to claim compensation before national courts for the harm caused to them by an infringement of those provisions.

The main changes introduced by the new regulation are: i) clarification of the legal consequences of “passing-on” and of the terms of “passing-on defence”, a legal construction of USA Law which had been already admitted and applied by EU Courts (e.g. in Germany Case ORWI, in Spain Case Sugar Cartel); ii) final decisions of a national competition authority will constitute prima facie evidence of infringement before the Courts of other Member States; iii) explicit recognition of the right to full compensation of the harm; iv) easier access to evidence, including the possibility of a judicial order requesting to other parties or third parties disclosure of documents if they are proportionate and provided that confidential information is duly protected; v) limitation period to claim damages will be 5 years since the victims have the possibility to discover that they have suffered harm, but this period will be suspended if a competition authority starts infringement proceeding and after final infringement decision the victims will have 1 year to bring damages claims; vi) presumption that cartels cause harm if no opposing evidence is offered. 

Update: on November 24, 2014 the Brussels Commercial Court has rejected a claim of the European Commission for damages caused by four Belgian elevator cartel members due to lack of evidence. The result might have been different under the presumption that cartels causes damages according to Art.9 2 EU Directive on Antitrust Damages Claims.

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Categories: Commercial Litigation | Damages

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My DRI Seminar Experience

Posted on January 7, 2015 10:10 by Denise Holzka

While I’m a bit freaked out to acknowledge this milestone, just about ten years ago I attended my first DRI Medical Liability and Health Care Law Seminar.  The following year I was given the opportunity to present at the Young Lawyers Breakout session.  Fast-forward several years later and I was speaking at the main gig for the not-so-young lawyers.  Presenting at both of these conferences, and attending many more, was instrumental in my development as a litigator in this field.  While the preparation of the materials and the presentations added a bit of stress to my otherwise stress-free existence as a New York trial lawyer, it was the productive type.  I wanted to ensure that if I was about to take up an hour of my peers’ time, that I better be a good presenter and have some incredibly useful information to convey.  Although I am modest, I nailed these presentations!  

Presenting and attending DRI’s Medical and Health Care Law Seminar has truly made me a better lawyer and advocate for my clients.  Many of the individuals I met the first time I presented have become life-long friends and colleagues.  As such, I am able to reach out to a diverse network of friends from all over the country whether to discuss business, experts, complex medicine or locate an establishment in their neighborhood to get an adult beverage.  

Personally, perhaps most rewarding, presenting at this seminar allowed me to take the time to appreciate the really important work that we do and the medical institutions and healthcare practitioners we represent.  We are generally so caught up in our work that we forget that we are an integral part of the delivery and quality of medical care.  It is a privilege to practice in this field as it was to present at prior DRI Medical Liability and Health Care Law Seminars.  I encourage you to attend this seminar with assurance that you will meet other professionals who are passionate about the work we do and will undoubtedly provide you with information to hone your skills.

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Sometimes Clients Will Just Not Pay You

Posted on January 5, 2015 02:51 by Steve Crislip

I am always amazed at how many clients decide not to pay their lawyers.  Perhaps as consumers, they are not savvy as to the ultimate costs of legal proceedings that drag on.  Perhaps we lawyers need to better educate and fully discuss fees up front.  Certainly criminal defense lawyers learned long ago to get most of their fee in advance. As the old lawyer said to the new one:  “There are three rules – (1) get your money upfront; (2) be very ethical in all you do; and (3) don’t forget to get your money upfront.”

For those who do charge by the hour, an advance or retainer is suggested for new and unproven clients.  Do not hesitate to ask for a reasonable retainer.  If they decline to pay such, it might be a clue not to represent them.  Often this advance can best be held until payment is past due and not used if monthly bills remain current.  By agreement it could be applied to the last bill or returned.

Any engagement letter should address in writing the right to withdraw if not paid and the requirement for the client to make timely payments of bills.  You are urged to discuss any withdrawal procedures with them and to give proper notice, under applicable rules, before withdrawing.  Lawyers should not be reluctant to withdraw when not paid either.  It is important to do that well before any critical deadlines and to advise the client upon withdrawal of all such deadlines in writing.  Otherwise, courts may not let you out because it would amount to abandonment, or the client will claim they did not know of the deadlines.  The point is that lawyers need to be better business managers of their work done.

In an extreme example, recently the firm of Morgan Lewis & Beckins was finally allowed to withdraw 30 years after it was fired by the client.  The Third Circuit would not grant the motion to withdraw until the client could retain substitute counsel, which did not happen.  Finally, a three-judge panel upheld the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s decision to let them out as counsel.  It makes the point that there are some clients you do not deserve to represent.

Often when either the case is over or the court has let you out, you are still owed large fees and expenses.  This is not a good thing.  If you file an action to collect, you most often see a counterclaim back for legal malpractice.  Some carriers prohibit such collection action because of such predictable claims back.  In fact, some courts have held that any possible claim the client has for legal malpractice is a compulsory counterclaim.  Harper v. Anthony, Ohio Eighth District Court of Appeals (2014).

So, what is a lawyer to do when owed money for work performed by agreement with the client.  One idea is to fully spell out in the engagement letter a prescribed arbitration that is limited exclusively to fee disputes and nothing else.  To avoid adhesion contracts, clients need to be advised to seek separate counsel on that issue. However, it is a way to litigate in an arbitration forum limited only to the fee issue.  Arbitration is not a good forum for legal malpractice claims and any agreement needs to be narrowly limited to just fee disputes.  That is a more efficient way to quickly handle a fee dispute for both the client and the lawyer.

Other options might be to agree upon a payment plan, backed up with an agreed promissory note.  If they fail to pay under the terms arranged, you could then collect upon the note and execute upon any judgment obtained.

Clearly, your best bet is careful screening of clients and their payment worthiness.  Refreshing retainers or additional advances will also help mitigate, but all must be clear in writing at the front of any engagement.  Discuss all with prospective clients and put it in writing to them. Be a better manager of your own practice this year.

This blog was originally posted on January 2 on Lawyering for Law Firms blog. Click here to read the original entry. 

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Frequently, nursing homes and long term care facilities find themselves the subject of claims for injuries or harm to patients stemming from insufficient staffing. Proving that the facility had enough employees on hand to properly care for its patients is essential to defending such claims.

Under California law, facilities must provide, at a minimum, 3.2 nursing hours per patient per day. (Health & Safety Code §1276.5.) However, according to the California Code of Regulations, facilities are required to have sufficient staff on hand and provide those nursing hours needed meet the individualized needs of its patients. (22 Cal.Code.Regs. §72501(e).)

An issue arises when a facility relies upon the Health and Safety Code requiring only 3.2 nursing hours per day per patient, and mistakenly believes that so long as this number is achieved, they have fulfilled their duties. However, in some cases 3.2 hours per patient may not be sufficient to care for the patient, resulting in a failure of the facility to meet the requirement of the California Code of Regulations to meet the individualized needs of its patients.

Facilities must be careful to ensure it is meeting the individual needs of its patients, rather than relying upon §1276.5 and its 3.2 hour requirement. A facility that relies only upon the 3.2 hour requirement and fails to provide care as needed may in fact demonstrate that it has disregarded the individual needs of its patients. Plaintiffs alleging wrongdoing by a nursing facility who are trying to prove the facility has failed to provide care as needed, and that as a result of insufficient staffing harm has occurred, may look to budget and cost records. A facility’s budget records can be utilized against a nursing facility to demonstrate that it budgeted only for staffing to provide 3.2 hours of nursing per day per patient. This evidence can show that the facility failed to meet the individualized needs of its patients by providing only the minimum standard of care.

Nursing facilities can help eliminate the risk of lawsuits and liability for insufficient care by ensuring the individualized needs of its patients are met. This means a careful review of the facilities’ patients and their needs is required on a consistent and frequent basis to assess the overall needs of the facility in terms of staffing.

If you are a nursing facility and have questions about the standard of care required for your patients, or have liability concerns, please contact Marc Zimet at Jampol Zimet, LLP at (213) 689-8500 or at, for a consultation to ensure your interests are protected before it is too late.

*This blog was originally posted to Jampol Zimet on December 23. Click here to read the original entry. 

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Categories: Medical Malpractics

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Attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine are essential to the success of every lawyer’s practice and every client’s case.  Attorney-client privilege—the oldest common law privilege relating to confidential communications—was established to encourage free and frank discussions between attorneys and their clients.  The work product doctrine offers broader protection of documents and other work that attorneys prepare in anticipation of litigation.  These seemingly simple principles are fraught with practical pitfalls, and they are often further complicated by the involvement of and communications between co-clients, joint clients, corporate clients, or third-party consultants. Today’s attorneys face even greater risks in this era of digital and instantaneous communication. Now more than ever, it is imperative that attorneys remain watchful for situations that threaten the privilege.

How do we recognize these risks and avoid them before it’s too late?  Are there any prophylactic measures we can take to protect the privilege and our own work product?  The 2015 DRI Women in the Law Seminar will focus its attention on Partnering with the Client for Success and includes a session devoted to preserving the attorney-client privilege. Our panel of in-house and outside counsel will explore real-world scenarios that could jeopardize the privilege, and share practical strategies for protecting clients’ privileged communications and work product.  In addition to this engaging session, the Women in the Law Seminar is devoted to providing concrete, actionable guidance on legal issues and emerging trends that keep clients (and their counsel) up at night.  The seminar also offers ample opportunity to connect corporate counsel and outside lawyers to enable us to partner with each other for success.

The 2015 Women in the Law Seminar will be held February 25-27 at the Hyatt Regency Pier Sixty-Six in Fort Lauderdale, Florida.  It is a terrifically convenient oceanside location just a short ride from the Miami airport. Register today by visiting

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Categories: Seminar | Women in Law

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More Obstacles for Food Labeling Class Actions

Posted on December 17, 2014 04:14 by James D. Smith

The Ninth Circuit is poised to address the implicit “ascertainability” requirement for class actions in Jones v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., No 14-16327 (9th Cir.). Briefing is underway in that matter in which the district court denied class certification when it concluded that the class wasn’t ascertainable and that the plaintiffs’ proposed damages model wasn’t methodologically sound. I wrote about that district court ruling in a post on June 26, 2014.  

The Jones appeal may provide some benefit to other defendants as a basis to stay other food labeling class actions.  In Gustavson v. Mars, Inc., No. 13-cv-04537-LHK (N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2014), Judge Lucy Koh stayed proceedings pending a decision in Jones: “The appellant in Jones has briefed issues concerning ascertainability and damages that could be material to the Court’s disposition of any class certification motion in the instant action.”  Judge Koh concluded that any decision in Jones likely will lead to additional briefing and possibly to more discovery regarding class certification in Gustavson. 

By itself, the stay is good news for food labeling defendants hoping for clarity regarding the ascertainability standard in the Ninth Circuit and the types of damages models that will or won’t suffice in food labeling class actions.  Judge Koh’s stay order is also noteworthy because she issued class certification decisions arguably at odds with the Jones district court decision at nearly the same time.  In Werdebaugh v. Blue Diamond Growers, No. 12-cv-2724-LHK (N.D. Cal. May 23, 2014), and Brazil v. Dole Packaged Foods, LLC, No. 12-CV-01831-LHK (N.D. Cal. May 30, 2014),  Judge Koh adopted fairly lenient standards for ascertainability and accepted the regression analysis methodology of the plaintiffs’ economist, Dr. Oral Capps—who is also the plaintiff’s expert in Gustavson.  In Jones, the district court immediately rejected the same Dr. Capps’ methodology.  Even Judge Koh later rejected Dr. Capps’ methodology when she granted summary judgment for the Brazil defendant on December 8, 2014.  And she decertified the class relying on Dr. Capps’ opinions in Werdebaugh on December 15.

It is too soon to conclude that regression analysis is finished as a damages model in food labeling class actions in the Northern District of California, but that methodology is far from proving itself as viable.  While some judges seemed willing to gloss over myriad problems with regression analyses in general—and Dr. Capps’ opinions in particular—in the early stages of food labeling class actions, the problems proved insurmountable as the cases continued to summary judgment or as more discovery of Dr. Capps’ methodology occurred.  We now have a nice body of case law from the Northern District raising questions about the viability of these classes and the plaintiffs’ favored expert witness.  Every defendant will want to move to stay proceedings while Ninth Circuit addresses Jones.  Based on the number of district court judges finding flaws in these classes, it seems like those jurists may welcome the opportunity to put the brakes on expanding the district’s reputation as the “food court.”  

James D. Smith is a partner in the Phoenix office of Bryan Cave LLP.  He is a member of the Class & Derivative Actions Client Service Group and the Food and Beverage Team.             


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The U.S. Supreme Court has granted review of Integrity Staffing Solutions v. Busk to determine whether time spent by employees in a security check line constitutes work and is therefore compensable. The case was brought by employees of Integrity Staffing Solutions, a temporary employee provider, who provided employees to Amazon.

In Integrity, temporary workers were assigned to work for Amazon at two of its Nevada warehouses. According to the class action plaintiffs, they regularly spent approximately 20-25 minutes at the end of each day in security checks when leaving work, waiting to be searched, empty their pockets, and pass through metal detectors. They claimed they were not compensated for this time and were due overtime pay. The workers argue that Amazon required them to clear security checks each day, as necessary to reduce employee theft from the warehouses. The plaintiffs went on to note that the Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 785 provides, “[t]he workweek ordinarily includes all time during which an employee is necessarily required to be on the employer’s premises, on duty, or at a prescribed workplace.” A workday is further defined as, “[t]he period between the time on any particular day when such employee commences his/her principal activity and the time on that day at which he/she ceases such principal activity or activities. The workday may therefore be longer than the employees scheduled shift hours, tour of duty, or production line time.”

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit noted that the FLSA, as amended by the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, “generally precludes compensation for activities that are ‘preliminary’ or ‘postliminary’ to the ‘principal activity or activities’ that the employee ‘is employed to perform.’” However, it also noted that “preliminary and postliminary activities are still compensable” if they are “integral and indispensable” to an employee’s principal activities. For example, in Steiner v. Mitchell, (1956)350 U.S. 247, 332, changing clothes and showering were “integral and indispensable” to the production of batteries. It has been held that to be “integral and indispensable,” an activity must be (1) “necessary to the principal work performed” and (2) “done for the benefit of the employer.” (Alvarez v. IBP, Inc. (2003) 339 Fed.3d 894, 902–03.)

In finding the employees entitled to compensation, the Ninth Circuit held that the security clearances were necessary to the “employee’s primary work as warehouse employees and done for Integrity’s benefit.

The Supreme Court, in issuing a decision on this issue, will clear up much confusion, as the Ninth Circuit’s decision is in direct conflict with other circuit rulings. In Gorman v. Consolidated Edison Corp. (2007) 488 Fed.3d 586, the Second Circuit ruled that time spent in a security screening by employees was not compensable. Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit issued a similar ruling in Bonilla v. Baker Concrete Construction (2007) 487 Fed.3d 1340.

The outcome of this case has the potential to reach thousands of workers who have worked for Amazon and have been subject to the security checks. Amazon employs approximately 38,000 temporary employees at its warehouses. It is estimated that if the Supreme Court affirms the Ninth Circuit ruling, damages will be in the millions.

Employers should be aware of the standards applied by the courts to determine whether their employees are entitled to compensation for activities required by the employer. Employers requiring their employees to spend time in security checks, change clothes, or otherwise take time to prepare for work should seek advice of counsel to determine whether such time is compensable. If you are an employer unsure about whether your employees must be compensed for time spent in security checks or preparing for work, please contact our attorneys at Jampol Zimet, LLP located at 800 Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, CA 90017, or at (213) 689-8500, for a consultation to ensure your interests are protected before it is too late.

This blog was first posted to Jampol Zimet’s Insurance Defense Blog. Click here to read the original entry. 

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