When an insurer sues for rescission, the insured is generally responsible for omissions and misrepresentations on insurance applications. That being said, when a third party brokers the deal between the insurer and the insured, he too is potentially liable. A recent District Court case out of Northern California case illustrates how a broker can be held liable to the insured for those same omissions and misrepresentations in rescission actions.

In James River Ins. Co. v. DCMI, Inc., 2012 WL 2873763 (N.D. Cal. July 12, 2012), James River Insurance Company brought suit against DCMI, a construction contractor, to rescind the insurance contract taken out. The insurer alleged that DCMI made material omissions and/or misrepresentations about prior claims or threatened litigation against them. DCMI, who used a broker, Powers & Company, to find James River Insurance Company, argued that they were not responsible for the omissions.
 
DCMI cross-filed to include Powers & Company as a defendant in the suit. Powers & Company filed out the insurance application on behalf of DCMI. DCMI alleged that in doing so the broker neglected to explain material terms and used a pre-filled form. The cross-filing complained of breach of contract, negligence, and breach of duty. Powers & Company moved to dismiss the suit against them for a failure to state a claim regarding all three counts. The trial court denied the motion in relevant part.
 
The court held that the breach of contract and negligence cause of actions were proper. In doing so, the court explained that under California law, an insurance broker has the general duties found in any agency relationship. This includes the duty to use reasonable care, diligence, and judgment in procuring the requested insurance coverage. Failing to properly fill out an application and explain material terms is a breach of said duty—a breach that can be an element within either cause of action.
 
In ruling on the first claim, the court held that the use of a pre-filed form and then failing to explain key terms to a client could amount to breach of contract in a broker-relationship. The court explained that a breach of contract claim requires the showing of four elements:  (1) the existence of a contract; (2) the plaintiff’s performance under the contract; (3) that the defendant breached the contract; and (4) the breach resulted in damage to the plaintiff. DCMI’s allegation of an arrangement and then the incorrectly completion of the forms was enough to survive a motion to dismiss.
 
On the second claim, the court held that although an insured bears the responsibility of omissions in application as to an insurer, the broker can still be liable to the insured. A negligence claim requires the showing of three elements: (1) breach of duty; (2) causation; and (3) damages. The court acknowledged that when an insurer seeks to rescind the insured bears the responsibility of the application. However, the court explained that nothing prevents the insured from then recovering from the broker where the broker is liable. In this case, the use of a pre-filled application and then failing to explain key terms could amount to negligence.
 
This case is significant because it shows just how far insurance broker liability can go. Even where the law already holds the insured responsible for rescission actions, a broker may be joined to the suit for his own negligence or breach arising out of the contract.

This was originally posted on the Jampol Zimet LLP’s Insurance Defense blog. Read the original post here.



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We previously discussed the troubling issues of:  a)whether your company’s insurance policy(ies) actually provides coverage for claims of IP infringement, and b)which of your policies is the one(s) you should be looking to for possible coverage when you get sued for infringement.

And for a great discussion of insurance coverage for IP infringement claims generally under the “Advertising Injury” clause of a standard commercial general liability policy, see Dan Graham’s article in the DRI insurance coverage newsletter.

This week we’ll get more specific:  a claim that was found by one California appeals court to be covered under a standard commercial general liability policy, and one that was found by a different division of the same appeals court not to be covered – both under the very same “advertising injury” clause of the policy.

Background
In Travelers Property Casualty Co. of America v. Charlotte Russe Holding, Inc., Charlotte Russe, a clothing retailer, requested its insurance company, Travelers, to defend it in a lawsuit brought by Versatile Entertainment, Inc. (Versatile v. Charlotte Russe – the “underlying lawsuit”).  Versatile is a manufacturer of “premium” clothing marketed under the brand “People’s Liberation.”  In the underlying lawsuit, Versatile alleged that Charlotte Russe had harmed the People’s Liberation “brand” of “high-end” and high-priced clothing by offering Versatile’s clothing for sale at deep discounts and at “close-out” prices, amounting to a “fire sale.”

Charlotte Russe’s request that Travelers defend it in the underlying lawsuit was based on the “Advertising Injury” clause in the Travelers’ policy issued to Charlotte Russe.  Travelers denied Charlotte Russe’s request.  Because of the disagreement between Charlotte Russe and Travelers, Travelers filed a separate lawsuit requesting a judicial determination of whether it was required to provide coverage to Charlotte Russe (Travelers v. Charlotte Russe – the “coverage lawsuit”).

Travelers Policy Defines Advertising Injury
In the Travelers policy, “Advertising Injury” was defined in several ways.  One of the definition of “Advertising injury” was, “injury . . . arising out of . . . material that . . . disparages a person’s or organization’s goods, products, or services.” In the coverage lawsuit, Travelers contended that Versatile’s allegations against Charlotte Russe in the underlying lawsuit did not amount to a claim that Charlotte Russe had “disparaged” the People’s Liberation brand.  A retailer’s mere reduction of a product’s price is not, argued Travelers, a disparagement of that product.  In order to satisfy the definition of “disparagement” under the policy, Travelers argued, Versatile would have to be alleging the elements of the tort of trade libel under California law against Charlotte Russe.

Trade Libel Not A Requirement for Committing Disparagement
Trade libel, in turn, requires the publication of an injurious false statement about a company or its goods or services.  The trial court in the coverage lawsuit agreed with Travelers’ position on the meaning of the term “disparagement” and granted summary judgment in its favor – meaning that Travelers had no obligation to defend Charlotte Russe in the underlying lawsuit.  Charlotte Russe appealed from this decision.

The California appeals court reversed, holding that Company A’s publication of an injurious false statement against Company B or Company B’s goods or services (i.e., the definition of trade libel) is not a requirement for establishing that Company A may have committed “disparagement” under the insurance policy.  In other words, reading the allegations in the underlying lawsuit, Charlotte Russe may have “disparaged” the People’s Liberation brand of clothing by implication, by selling the clothing at “fire sale” prices.  The gist of the underlying lawsuit, said the court, is that Versatile was accusing Charlotte Russe of impliedly telling the world that the People’s Liberation brand of clothing is not a premium, high-end line, which, according to Versatile, is false. According to the court, that is disparagement.  Lastly, the court said that there was nothing in the language of Travelers’ policy that said the definition of “disparagement” is equal to the legal definition of trade libel.  Accordingly, the appeals court reversed the trial court, and held that Travelers was required to defend Charlotte Russe in the underlying lawsuit.  Travelers appealed this decision to the California Supreme Court, but its petition for appeal was denied.

Sister Appeals Court Comes to Opposite Conclusion
A little more than three months later, a different panel of the same California appeals court came to exactly the opposite conclusion in the case of Hartford Casualty Ins. Co. v. Swift Distribution, Inc.  In this case, the issue was whether Hartford had to defend its insured, Swift, in a lawsuit brought by Gary-Michael Dahl.  Dahl sells an item called the “Multi-Cart.”  Swift started advertising and selling an item called the “Ulti-Cart.”  Swift’s advertisements made no mention of Dahl or the “Multi-Cart.”  Dahl sued Swift for patent infringement, trademark infringement, unfair competition, trademark dilution, and misleading advertising (Dahl v. Swift – the “underlying lawsuit”).  Among other things, Dahl alleged that Swift’s advertisements for the Ulti-Cart “disparaged” Dahl’s Multi-Cart by implication.  Swift requested that its insurance company, Hartford, defend it in the lawsuit brought by Dahl.  Swift requested coverage under the “Advertising Injury” clause of the policy.

The definition of “Advertising Injury” in the Hartford policy was exactly the same as the definition in the Travelers policy in the Travelers v. Charlotte Russe case, above.  Hartford refused Swift’s request, arguing that Dahl’s allegations in the underlying lawsuit against Swift weren’t covered under the policy.  To settle the dispute – just as Travelers had done against Charlotte Russe – Hartford filed a coverage lawsuit against Swift.  That is, it sued Swift for a judicial determination of whether it had a duty to defend Swift in the underlying lawsuit.  While Hartford’s coverage lawsuit against Swift was pending, Dahl and Swift settled the underlying lawsuit.

In Hartford’s coverage lawsuit, Swift alleged that Dahl’s claims in the underlying lawsuit came within the definition of “Advertising Injury.”  The trial court ruled in Hartford’s favor, finding that, on the undisputed facts, which, in this case, were:
a) the allegations in Dahl’s complaint against Swift in the underlying lawsuit, and
b) the terms of the Hartford policy issued to Swift, there was no “disparagement” by Swift.  Swift appealed.

Insurer Does Not Have to Provide Coverage
This time, the California appeals court – again, a different division of the very same appeals court that found coverage in the Travelers v. Charlotte Russe case – affirmed the trial court’s decision of no insurance coverage.  The appeals court here found that Dahl’s underlying lawsuit did make a variety of allegations that Dahl and its product, the Multi-Cart, were harmed by Swift’s infringements, by its unfair competition, and by its false and misleading advertising.  Nevertheless, the court found that Swift’s advertisements did not actually disparage – i.e., express an “injurious falsehood” about – Dahl or the Multi-Cart because the advertisements never mentioned Dahl or the Multi-Cart.

Swift then argued that in the underlying lawsuit Dahl had alleged that Swift’s advertisements referred to Dahl’s Multi-Cart by implication.  The court found that even if this were true, Swift’s advertisements mentioned only its own product, the Ulti-Cart.  Regardless of whether Swift’s conduct might constitute trademark infringement and unfair competition against Dahl and the Multi-cart, Swift’s advertisements did not disparage Dahl or the Multi-Cart.

Therefore, the appeals court held that, because Swift’s advertisements had not disparaged Dahl or the Multi-Cart, Dahl’s underlying lawsuit did not come within the Advertising Injury coverage clause of Hartford’s policy issued to Swift, and Hartford was not required to defend Swift in the underlying lawsuit.

Notably, the appeals court in Hartford v. Swift said that its sister court’s decision in Travelers v. Charlotte Russe was wrong.  It said that discounted pricing (which was the operative allegation in the Versatile v. Charlotte Russe lawsuit) is not “disparagement.”  It said that discounted pricing is not the same thing as the publication of an injurious false statement.  The language used by the Hartford v. Swift court in expressing its disagreement with its sister court is about as clear and strong as one finds in court opinions.

Swift has appealed the coverage case to the California Supreme Court, which has not yet decided whether it will hear the case.  I’m guessing the Supreme Court will take the case now that two California appeals courts have come to opposite results in interpreting the same clause in a standard insurance policy.

Takeaway
The lesson here is that claims against you or your client of patent infringement, trademark infringement, unfair competition, trademark dilution, and/or misleading advertising might not constitute “disparagement” under your insurance policy.  If you sell a product, especially one that competes with other similar products on the market, you need to purchase your insurance carefully, and look for policies that will cover you for the types of claims you might face:  infringement- and unfair competition-type claims by your competitors, and products liability-type claims by the purchasers of your product(s).

In the coming weeks and months, we’ll check the status of the appeal in the Hartford v. Swift case and have more to say on insurance coverage issues for intellectual property infringement claims.

Walter Judge is a litigation partner at Downs Rachlin Martin PLLC who blogs on intellectual property litigation topics. You can find his original post here

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Harvard University and the National Football League Players Association (“NFLPA”) are negotiating a deal with the NFL seeking a $100 million grant for the purpose of studying, diagnosing, and treating injuries and ailments suffered by players as a result of their football careers.


Dr. Lee Nadler, the Harvard Medical School Dean for clinical and translational research, attested to the groundbreaking nature of the proposed project, noting “[n]o one has ever studied the players [themselves] before.  There have been postmortem studies looking at the brains of previous players but not the players today.”

One has to wonder how generous the NFL will continue to be – after all, the league just donated $30 million to the National Institutes of Health last year to study brain injuries in NFL alumni.  Still, proponents of the Harvard study made sure to stress that this would not be simply another concussion study; instead, it would consider a whole host of health ailments potentially facing former NFL players  including chronic pain, depression, heart problems, and diabetes.  The scope of the proposed research is beyond anything that has been conducted to this point – preliminary estimates called for a nation-wide group of 200 NFL alumni drawn from a 1,000 person study group, with all participants being subject a wide array of medical tests.

Dr. Herman Taylor, one of the non-Harvard medical professionals retained for the study, stated, “Typically, when we do a test or medical study, we’re taking a snapshot.  What we want to do is see the full-length movie of what happens to a player over time.”

On the issue of funding, NFLPA Executive George Atallah noted, “Given the scope of health issues that NFL players are subject to, we are committed to making sure that enough money is allocated to get answers.”  However, because the research will be funded by a portion of league revenues, the actual amount the NFL is willing to put towards the study will likely not be determined until after the Super Bowl.

As originally published at Sportslawinsider.com on January 31, 2013
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A Pennsylvania district court in CAMICO Mutual Insurance Co. v. Heffler, Radetich & Saitta, LLP (E.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 2013), refused to allow an insurer access to its insured’s defense file, holding that that the insurer was not a client of the insured’s defense counsel.  There, CAMICO Mutual Insurance Co. insured Heffler, Radetich & Saitta, L.L.P. (“Heffler”) which was sued for misappropriating class action settlement proceeds.  In response to the suit, Heffler selected its defense counsel, and CAMICO agreed to pay defense counsel’s fees.  

CAMICO filed this declaratory judgment action seeking a finding apparently regarding the available policy limits.  In connection therewith, CAMICO sought production of certain documents related to the underlying lawsuit.  Heffler refused, and CAMICO moved to compel.  CAMICO argued the application of exceptions to the attorney-client privilege, which the parties agreed would have otherwise protected the documents from production.

CAMICO relied on the co-client exception, which concerns where two or more clients share the same attorney.  CAMICO argued that the exception applied because defense counsel represented the joint interests of Heffler and CAMICO with respect to the underlying lawsuit.  The district court disagreed, relying on several authorities for the proposition that the insurer is not automatically a client of defense counsel, even when it funds its insured’s defense.  Further, the district court found that based on the factual record, CAMICO was not a client of defense counsel.  Therefore, the district court denied CAMICO’s motion.

Notably, the district court glossed over three important issues, which merit a brief discussion here:  (1) Heffler’s choice of its own defense counsel, (2) the common interest exception as an exception to the attorney-client privilege, and (3) CAMICO’s providing a defense to Heffler in the underlying lawsuit while seeking to litigate the extent of coverage.  

First, that Heffler chose its own defense counsel made the arguments in favor of the co-client exception peculiar.  If CAMICO had appointed defense counsel for Heffler, there probably would have been a better argument for a co-client exception.  

Second, several courts recognize the common interest doctrine as an exception to the attorney-client privilege.  E.g., Waste Management, Inc. v. Int’l Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 144 Ill. 2d 178, 579 N.E.2d 322 (1991).   Although the district court asserted, without more, that CAMICO’s counsel did not share information with Heffler’s defense counsel, that is the point—CAMICO desired that defense counsel provide its counsel with otherwise privileged information.  This may have been a legitimate exception to the attorney-client privilege.   And, the Third Circuit and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania have not taken a position on whether they will follow the Illinois Supreme Court’s interpretation of the common interest exception as set forth in Waste Management. 

Third and finally, that CAMICO was not seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify suggests that CAMICO and Heffler could have a common interest with respect to the underlying lawsuit.  Most courts that have criticized the Waste Management reject, in pertinent part, the concept that the insurer can seek to vindicate its disclaimer of coverage in a declaratory judgment action, yet have a common interest with its abandoned insured in the underlying tort action.  While subject to debate, that CAMICO was merely seeking to litigate the available limits suggests that the common interest exception may be available here.

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The Zhang case is a dispute following a fire at the plaintiff’s commercial property wherein the uninsured Zhang accuses the defendant-insurer of misconduct. The first two actions in the plaintiff’s complaint consist of 88 paragraphs arguing common law allegations of misconduct by the insurance company. Then, in her third cause of action, the plaintiff incorporates these paragraphs and alleges that the defendant engaged in false advertising. That last allegation starts the case down its controversial path.


The Zhang trial court sustained the insurer’s demurrer on the grounds that an earlier Court of Appeal case, Trexton Financial Corp. v. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, precluded suit under Insurance Code section 790.03 (a.k.a. Fair Claims Handling Act, FCHA). On review, the appellate court disapproved of the Textron holding and held that the allegations of false advertising permitted suit under the Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq (a.k.a. Unfair Competition Law, UCL).

To address the appellate court’s ruling in Zhang and the difference between it and Textron, we need to understand the current law. The UCL is a set of statutory codes that allow private persons to sue businesses for five types of conduct: (1) an unlawful business practice; (2) an unfair business practice; (3) a fraudulent business act (4) unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising; or (5) other acts prohibited by later sections of the code. Insurance companies are businesses within this law. A UCL cause of action requires some “predicate” violation, meaning that the plaintiff must complain of some conduct by a business-defendant in order to bring the claim.

As for the FCHA, it too is a set of statutory codes and it too sets out to stop unfair business practices; acts such as disseminating false insurance statements, making false entries into insurance reports, improperly disclosing private financial information. Unlike the UCL, the Legislature wrote the FCHA to apply specifically to insurance companies—almost exhaustively. The  California Supreme Court previously ruled in Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Companies that private plaintiffs cannot bring actions under FCHA. The Supreme Court has not held the same when it comes to the UCL. And that is the issue at the heart of Zhang when it comes before the supreme court this year.

Like in Zhang, in Textron, the plaintiff also alleged that the insurer engaged in misconduct that violated the FCHA and brought a UCL claim. The Textron appellate court upheld the defendant’s demurrer dismissing the case and pointed out that the conduct the plaintiff complained of was similar to the conduct covered by the FCHA and therefore the plaintiff could not bring a private cause of action. The appellate court in Textron held that, because in Moradi-Shalal the Supreme Court held that FCHA does not allow a private cause of action, FCHA violations cannot be the predicate violation for a UCL claim.

The differences between Textron and the appellate decision in Zhang is FCHA violations can serve as the predicate for a UCL cause of action. Textron unequivocally disfavored such a practice, holding that a plaintiff cannot use the UCL to avoid the Moradi holding. Zhang is holding otherwise. In Zhang, the UCL claim remained even though it was an FCHA violation. Now that we have two courts of equal standing handing down opposite rulings, the California Supreme Court must make a ruling to determine which way the law goes.

There is no evidence to suggest that the California Supreme Court will alter Moradi as to the holding denying a private right of action for violations of the FCHA. However, good public policy indicates that the Zhang approach—allowing UCL claims for FCHA violations—is the right approach. As a general matter, the UCL acts to empower private citizens to enforce fair business practices when the attorney general cannot or chooses not to do so. By extending the right to cover citizens aggrieved by insurance companies, the system can better protect those that are wronged. Moreover, because a successful plaintiff recovers restitution and not damages, the results will be equitable. Essentially, private citizens will be able to file claims to force an insurer to comply with the FCHA and then recover any money or property wrongfully taken.

Posted on January 21, 2013 by jampolzimetlaw
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On October 31, 2012, lawyers representing thousands of former NFL players filed an opposition brief to the NFL’s current motion to dismiss pending in U.S. District Court in Pennsylvania, insisting that based on the gravity of the harm incurred, their lawsuit against the League must be allowed to move forward.  The brief rejected the NFL’s contention that the action was essentially a labor dispute that needed to be resolved under the league’s collective bargaining agreement.

The Plaintiffs accused the NFL of “orchestrat[ing] a disinformation campaign,” insisting that the League “knew that players were exposed to risks of severe neurological injuries yet did nothing to prevent them.”  However, the League has, time and again, publicly denied that it knew of any long-term dangers posed by concussions.  Further, the NFL insists that it did not intentionally lie to players about the potential side effects.  Instead, it stated that it delegated the decisions about players’ conditions and return-to-play decisions to individual team doctors and trainers.

At this point, U.S. District Judge Anita Brody must decide how to proceed with the extremely cumbersome litigation.  If a settlement is not reached and the case is not dismissed, it is possible that the individual cases could be returned to the multiple districts where they originated forcing the parties to proceed with separate trials.

Ex-players reply to NFL’s motion to dismiss cases

As orrignally posted on Sports Law Insider on November 14, 2012
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ON YOUR MARK…., GET SET…., SHOP!

Posted on November 15, 2012 02:17 by Philip M. Gulisano

With the start of the holiday shopping rush just a week away, retailers should be mindful of their responsibility to keep customers safe when large crowds gather to take advantage of well-advertised and highly-anticipated sales. Customers, drawn by the promise of “doorbuster savings” and warned of limited quantities, do not always act in the most courteous manner when rushing to enter the store and running toward the products they desire.  Sadly, it has become all too common for injury, whether accidental or intentional, to occur as customers dash into and through stores during these special sales, and when a customer is injured during the clamor, a retailer can be held liable.

Although the law varies from state to state, in many states, a retailer’s duty to use reasonable care to protect customers from reasonably anticipated injuries includes foreseeing that large crowds might gather due to the advertised sales and that individuals might be injured due to the overcrowding, the congestion at the door, or the unruliness of the other customers.  Consequently, a retailer may be held liable to a customer who is injured due to pushing, crowding, trampling, or jostling by other customers when the retailer conducts a promotional activity or sale that will foreseeably cause crowds to gather and push.

At least one jury has determined that reasonable care when undertaking a special promotion that might cause people to run, push, and shove includes the retailer giving warnings of the dangers involved, taking steps to control or police the crowd, using loud speakers to warn the crowd not to run over people, and warning the elderly or children to stay out of the crowd.    Given the tragedies that have occurred in the past several years during “Black Friday Sales,” it is advisable for retailers to, at the very least, implement the above measures.  However, the above measures may not be sufficient given the particular circumstances of a retailer.  That is why each retailer should conduct a careful risk assessment evaluation that is tailored to its location and history.  This assessment will allow the retailer to develop and implement a plan that keeps its customers safe and happy during this holiday season. Now go shopping!

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It is not uncommon for plaintiffs to argue - and for some defense lawyers to agree - that individual life, health, or disability insurance policies cannot be part of an employee welfare benefit plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. Section 1001, et seq. ("ERISA"). Not so. ERISA broadly provides that an employee welfare benefit plan can be funded "through the purchase of insurance or otherwise," 29 U.S.C. §1002(1), and makes no distinction between individual insurance and group insurance. Thus, benefits under an ERISA-compliant plan can be funded by one or more group or individual insurance policies, or a combination of group and individual insurance policies.

In the past year, there have been several federal district court decisions holding that programs involving individual disability insurance policies are governed by ERISA, even in some instances where the actual structure of the ERISA program expired before an insured filed a claim for benefits under the policy. This article will discuss two of those decisions - both in California - as illustrations of the types of arrangements involving individual insurance policies that courts have found to be regulated by ERISA.

Indicia of an ERISA Plan

The ultimate question in determining whether any insurance policy - individual or group - is regulated by ERISA, is whether the policy is part of an employment relationship. That necessarily requires the establishment of an employer-employee relationship, i.e., there must be an employer and at least one covered employee/participant. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. §2510.3-3(b) and (c) (every ERISA plan must cover at least one common law employee). It also requires evidence that the insurance policy is part of the employment relationship.

In a typical group insurance arrangement, a group insurance policy is issued to an employer who determines that it will provide coverage to a select group of employees. The employer also typically contributes at least part of the cost of the employee's coverage and/or performs other functions or actions indicating that the employer endorses the program and/or has adopted the policies as part of its overall employee benefit program.

A typical program involving individual policies of insurance is not so different. Examples of some of the common practices involving individual insurance policies can include the following:

  • A multi-life program, sometimes exhibited in a written agreement between an employer and an insurer.
  • The employer selects the broker, the insurer, and sometimes the types of policies that will make up the program.
  • The employer may agree to accept certain responsibilities for establishing and/or maintaining the program, such as payment of all or a portion of the premiums.
  • Premiums are subject to a discount as a result of the agreement between the employer and the insurer.
  • There may be other benefits such as abbreviated underwriting procedures or higher coverage limits.
  • Billings are made directly to the employer, sometimes referred to as a "list bill."
  • Individual policies are issued to a select group of employees, many times including one or more owner/employees of the employing entity (frequently a professional corporation).
  • The employer maintains ongoing communication with the insurer, including administrative tasks such as informing the insurer when new employees are hired or existing employees are terminated.
  • The employer facilitates payment of the premiums. The actual financial responsibility for the premiums may occur in a number of ways, e.g., the employer may absorb the cost, the employer may pass on some or all of the cost to the employees (such as through payroll deductions or via a flexible benefits program), the employer may ask the employees to pay the premiums directly and may reimburse the employees through a bonus program, or the cost of the premiums may be deducted from various expense accounts available to the employees. Many times the purpose of passing on the costs to the employees is to ensure that any benefits would not be subject to income taxes.

Structure of an ERISA Plan

The structure of an ERISA welfare benefit plan is statutory and requires five elements: (a) a plan, fund, or program; (b) established or maintained; (c) by an employer (or an employee organization); (d) for the purpose of providing statutory benefits (including life, health, and disability insurance); (e) to participants and beneficiaries. 29 U.S.C. §1002(1). In the context of group or group-type insurance programs, courts also look to whether the program falls within the "safe harbor" regulation, which excludes any program from ERISA where the employer is a mere advertiser of the program. In order to satisfy the regulatory safe harbor, a plan must satisfy several elements. Two of these elements are most often in dispute when one is attempting to determine whether a plan is exempt from ERISA: (a) whether the employer contributes to the program; and (b) whether the employer has endorsed the program. Satisfaction of either of these elements removes a plan from the safe harbor exemption. 29 C.F.R. §2510.3-1(j).

Case Study: Zide v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins.

The employer in Zide v. Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153777 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 9, 2011) signed a salary allotment agreement with Provident Life & Accident Insurance Company whereby the employer represented that it would pay the entire premium cost in consideration for Provident to issue individual disability policies to select employees of a medical corporation, some of whom were also shareholders of the corporation. The salary allotment agreement was in effect for many years. During that time, various doctors were covered under the plan. Some of the doctors were employees when first covered, but later became shareholders. Premiums were billed via periodic list bills sent to the corporation and the corporation paid the premiums. The corporation then charged the premiums back to the various doctors. There was a substantial premium discount as well as other benefits which continued even if a doctor left the corporation and continued to pay the policy premiums. By the time Dr. Zide filed a claim for benefits under his policy, he was the only insured left at the corporation and he was the sole owner of the corporation. When Provident terminated Dr. Zide's benefits, he sued under California state law and alleged bad faith, seeking compensatory and punitive damages. Provident alleged, among other things, that Dr. Zide's policy was governed by ERISA and that his bad faith claim was preempted.

The district court granted judgment to Provident, ruling that the insurance program was an ERISA plan and that Dr. Zide's state law claims were preempted. Applying the statutory five-factor test, the district court concluded:

  • Although there was no formal plan document apart from the insurance policy, there was an established plan, fund, or program in that the plan was a reality and not a mere promise of future potential coverage.
  • The program was established and maintained by the employer corporation: premiums were paid initially by the employer; the employer performed other ongoing administrative services, including maintaining contact with the insurer over a period of years; and the employees received a substantial discount and other benefits from the arrangement.
  • The corporation was an employer and was identified as such in the salary allotment agreement with the insurer.
  • The program provided statutory benefits (benefits in the event of disability).
  • There were participants in the program in that the program covered at least one non-owner employee of the corporation at least some point during the program's existence.

The district court also concluded that the program fell outside of the safe harbor exemption. Even though the employees bore the ultimate cost of the premiums, the availability of a discount through the efforts and commitment of the employer and which was in existence solely by virtue of the employment relationship, constituted an employer contribution to the program. Finally, the court ruled that even though the program might not satisfy all of the ERISA requirements at the time Dr. Zide filed his benefit claim -- because it no longer covered at least one non-owner employee -- the fact that the program had at one time been governed by ERISA meant that Dr. Zide's policy continued to be governed by ERISA as he continued to reap the various benefits (discounted premiums and higher levels of coverage) made available to him by the employment relationship and the employer's commitments to the insurer.

Case Study: Masteler v. Paul Revere Life Ins.

Another recent example of an individual disability insurance policy being governed by ERISA is the case of Masteler v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21725 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 2012). In that case, a large national employer entered into an "employee security program" with Paul Revere whereby the insurer agreed to issue individual disability income policies to a select group of executive employees with favorable coverage options and substantial premium discounts, in exchange for the employer's promise to pay the premiums. The program was in effect for several years and multiple policies were issued to executive employees of the employer during that time. When the plaintiff applied for his policy, he represented to the insurer that his employer would pay the entire premium cost. The evidence indicated that the employer did pay the first annual premium for his policy, but several months after the policy was issued, the plaintiff left his employment. He continued the policy, agreeing to pay future premiums himself.

The plaintiff became disabled due to a heart condition and was paid benefits for several years. When benefits were about to reach the maximum pay period under the policy, the plaintiff argued that his heart condition was an injury rather than a sickness, triggering the lifetime benefit clause of the policy. The insurer disagreed, benefits were terminated, and the plaintiff sued under California state law, alleging bad faith and seeking compensatory and punitive damages. Among other things, Paul Revere argued that the policy was governed by ERISA and that the plaintiff's state law claims were preempted.

The district court agreed with Paul Revere and dismissed the plaintiff's state law complaint. The court held that where an employer enters into an agreement with an insurer to make individual disability policies available to employees at discounted premiums and higher coverage levels and pays the premiums, the employer has established an ERISA plan. The court ruled that the regulatory safe harbor did not apply because the employer paid the premium cost. Finally, the court ruled that where the employee elected to continue his coverage under the same policy and under the same terms after he left his employment, the fact that the plaintiff took over the premium payments did not remove the policy from ERISA. The plaintiff's claim was governed exclusively by ERISA and his state law claims were preempted.

Conclusion

The Zide and Masteler decisions are just a couple of examples of situations where individual insurance policies were held to be governed by ERISA. These decisions dispel the myth that only group insurance policies can be part of an ERISA plan and that individual insurance is invariably subject to state law. Of course, in order for ERISA to apply, there must be a nexus to an employment relationship, but once that nexus is established, many fact scenarios may bring individual policy coverage under ERISA and outside of state law.

Mark E. Schmidtke

Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C.

mark.schmidtke@ogletreedeakins.com

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Insurance Coverage and Cyber Crimes

Posted on September 13, 2012 07:56 by Brenda K. Wallrichs

A recent report indicated there have been almost 200 high profile data breaches this year, resulting in the exposure of over 13 million records.  Among the information released was social security numbers, bank account numbers, patient and medical information, and other personal data.  In addition to these large scale breaches, breaches on a smaller scale occur daily, from employees accessing and misusing electronic information stored by their employers to students utilizing Facebook posts to bully.  These breaches clearly raise privacy concerns and cause headaches and in some cases heartache for the individuals whose information was disseminated.  But the breaches also create serious liabilities for the entities that were entrusted to secure the information and for the persons who accessed it.

An emerging and evolving issue concerning data breaches and other cyber crimes is the availability of insurance coverage for the persons bearing responsibility for the release and improper use of the information.  Courts struggle with applying traditional CGL policies to cyber losses, and insurers are responding with a variety of new products.  The availability of coverage, both under traditional policies and under more recently developed policies, is a topic that will be discussed at the DRI Insurance Law Committee’s Insurance Coverage and Practice Symposium.  Please join us in New York City, December 6-7, for more discussion about this topic.

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Class Actions and The Supreme Court

Posted on September 4, 2012 02:09 by Michael Aylward

As the rest of us return from the last long weekend of summer, the U.S. Supreme Court send us scurrying back to our computers this morning with news that it has accepted Travelers' cert petition in Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 11-1450.  At issue is a ruling by an Arkansas District Court declaring that Travelers could not remove a homeowner's class action against to federal court because the underlying claimants had stipulated that they were seeking damages under $5 million, the jurisdictional limit for removal under CAFA.  

In its cert petition, Travelers observed that last year, the Supreme Court ruled in Smith v. Bayer Corp,  131 S. Ct. 2368, 2382 (2011) that in a putative class action "the mere proposal of a class ... could not bind persons who were not parties."  In this case, it asks:  

When a named plaintiff attempts to defeat a defendant's right of removal under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 by filing with a class action complaint a "stipulation" that attempts to limit the damages he "seeks" for the absent putative class members to less than the $5 million threshold for federal jurisdiction, and the defendant establishes that the actual amount in controversy, absent the "stipulation," exceeds $5 million, is the "stipulation" binding on absent class members so as to destroy federal jurisdiction?   

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