Lance Armstrong is riding a new tour these days, but instead of fresh air and the beautiful landscapes of France, this tour will be inside offices (lawyers’ offices) and courtrooms. Yes, it is the Tour de Courts.  Since his confession to doping in an interview with Oprah Winfrey, his legal problems have compiled dramatically. 

One of the more public legal disputes is with SCA Promotions (SCA). SCA helps companies run promotions that involve large payouts – payouts that these companies would otherwise not be able to offer. For example, suppose a company sponsors a “half-court shot” during a local college game. A contestant is selected to make the shot. If that contestant makes the basket, he or she wins $250,000. The sponsoring company will pay a percentage of the total prize offering to SCA. If the basket is made, SCA pays the $250,000.  It’s an insurance of sorts with the fees acting as a kind of premium.

SCA entered into one of these contracts Lance Armstrong.  SCA would pay millions including bonuses if Armstrong won multiple Tours de France. SCA is no stranger to the issue of doping and Lance Armstrong – which is what this current litigation is all about. SCA paid the winnings but withheld his bonuses originally amidst early allegations of doping. However, in the end, a $7.5 million settlement ultimately resolved that dispute.  Now that Armstrong has confessed to doping, SCA wants their money back and took Armstrong to court to get it.

Armstrong counters that the original settlement agreement contained a “Will Not Challenge Under Any Circumstances” clause and has filed papers with the court seeking dismissal of SCA’s lawsuit.  SCA counters that Armstrong lied during the original dispute and that Armstrong perpetuated fraud in negotiating the original settlement.

This is but one stop on the Tour de Courts for Armstrong and, though one of the most public, not the most serious. Amongst the agencies suing Armstrong is the Department of Justice who accuses him of defrauding the U.S. government (the U.S. Postal Service was a big sponsor).

This upcoming tour will make the mountains classification of the Tour de France seem easy. However, in this tour, there are no additional points for getting to the top first.

*This blog was originally published on April 11 on the Sports and Entertainment Law Insider. Read the original post here. 

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Categories: Drug and Device Law | Marketing | Media

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Authority without accountability is dangerous. Accountability without authority is agonizing. Such agony is manifest in two ediscovery sanction awards making the rounds recently. Peerless has commentators warning us not to pass to the buck to our ediscovery vendor. While Branhaven has raised questions of how much outside counsel can rely on their client when certifying discovery responses (in addition to reaching questionable conclusions re PDF vs. TIFF productions).

The commentary on both cases has been excellent. Much it has focused, understandably, on the division of responsibility – who is accountable for what. Outside counsel, it seems, can trust only themselves – not the vendor (Peerless); not their own client (Branhaven). Nor, of course, can anyone rely on custodians to comply with hold instructions (as we learned in Samsung), let alone self-collect

In holding the parties accountable both rulings suggest some implicit assumptions about authority that are worth exploring. Specifically, Branhaven assumes that outside counsel will, if she chooses, have visibility into a client’s efforts to assemble documents; while Peerless assumes that a domestic party can supervise document collection efforts at a foreign affiliate. 

In Branhaven, outside counsel appears to have little idea as to what his client, Branhaven, was actually doing. Counsel forwarded requests for production to Branhaven. Counsel then certified written responses to requests representing that responsive documents would be produced. Counsel based his certification on his “understanding” that Branhaven was assembling the responsive documents. But, as the District Court in Maryland found and sanctioned, Branhaven’s effort in identifying and assembling responsive documents was lacking. In what appears to be a first, the court also sanctioned outside counsel for failure to make a “reasonable inquiry” into his client’s process and progress—or lack thereof, as it turned out.

I don’t know enough about the specific facts underlying Branhaven to pass judgment on counsel’s behavior. But I do feel a general sympathy for outside counsel whose queries are met with “we’re handling it”—whatever “it” happens to be. Further inquiry may be required as a matter of professional necessity. But pressing in-house counsel for additional information is risky from the perspective of positional power and relationship maintenance. 

Many in-house counsel are under enormous pressure to keep costs down and are therefore inclined to do as much work themselves as they can manage. Discussions with outside counsel about that work are just another cost to be avoided. Further, many in-house counsel are offended at the thought of outside counsel questioning their work, judgment, process, etc. because….well, because being the boss can go to one’s head (sorry if I am shocking anyone’s delicate sensibilities here). Finally, regardless of the motivation, what can outside counsel really do if in-house counsel is not inclined to share? There are options, few of them good – e.g., quit, send CYA memos.

A similar dynamic exists between affiliated entities. In Peerless, the vendor on whom too much reliance was placed was responsible for collecting documents from defendant’s non-party, Chinese affiliate. The Northern District of Illinois sanctioned the defendant, Crimson for having an insufficient basis to support its assertion that all responsive documents in the possession of its non-party, Chinese affiliate, Sycamore, had been produced.

The Peerless court had previously ruled that defendant Crimson was able to obtain documents from Sycamore and must therefore do so. Crimson subsequently produced documents provided by Sycamore via a vendor. In conjunction with the production, Crimson represented that all responsive documents had been turned over. The court, however, was unimpressed with Crimson’s “hands-off approach” to managing discovery at Sycamore. Rather than passive recipients of their foreign affiliate’s documents, the court found that Sycamore had a duty to directly “contact individuals at Sycamore and play a role in obtaining discovery.”

Again, I don’t pretend to know the particulars of Peerless. But I possess considerable sympathy for a domestic entity that is responsible for collecting documents from a foreign affiliate. Affiliates do not always play nice with each other. A request for assistance can run into (a) company politics, sibling rivalries, internecine conflicts, etc., (b) a genuine sense of we work at different companies, don’t tell me what to do, (c) busy people who have no time or incentive to worry about your problem, (d) a colorable conclusion that this ediscovery stuff is a bit daft; or (e) all of the above. 

The challenges are only more daunting when the affiliate is in a different country where geographic distance, language barriers, cultural differences, and variations in IT infrastructure are only the most obvious obstacles. These dynamics can become particularly untenable when the requesting entity is a small subsidiary of a large, foreign parent from whom the documents are needed. What is a domestic, in-house attorney supposed to do when a VIP at the mothership proves unresponsive to pleas for assistance? There are options; few of them good – e.g., CYA memos; try to go above the VIP.

I am not suggesting that either case was wrongly decided. Courts also face authority constraints. Their power is often limited to those who appear before them – i.e., lawyers and the parties they represent. It is unsurprising who was held accountable in Branhaven and Peerless. But it is still unsettling. Those of us who remain unconvinced of our own omnipotence can easily imagine ourselves in either position regardless of our experience, effort, acuity, etc. 

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Law.com’s Legal Blog Watch recently noted a viral Facebook photo involving a “footlong” sandwich that appeared to be less than 12 inches long:  http://legalblogwatch.typepad.com/legal_blog_watch/2013/01/how-many-inches-is-your-subway-footlong-sub.html.  Citing a post from Today where restaurant customers were posting pictures of footlong sandwiches, http://lifeinc.today.com/_news/2013/01/17/16565128-wheres-the-inch-subways-footlong-falls-short?lite, Legal Blog Watch asked whether a class action or two or three would soon follow.  One might reasonably question whether customers suffered any damages by the claimed shortfall.  One might further question how plaintiffs’ counsel could possibly prove any sort of claim on a class-wide basis.  Nonetheless, the fact that such questions come to mind shows the pervasiveness of class action litigation in today’s society.  The issues inherent in the current use of the class action device are of such importance that the U.S. Supreme Court’s current docket features five merits cases involving class action claims.  Those Supreme Court cases, along with a number of other cutting-edge class action topics, will be the subject of DRI’s 2013 Class Action Seminar, which will take place at the Washington Court Hotel in Washington, DC on July 25 and 26.  DRI members interested in this area of law will want to attend this Program.

 

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Wisconsin Act 10

Posted on September 18, 2012 10:12 by Laurie E. Meyer

2011 Wisconsin Act 10 (“Act 10”), which was signed into law by Governor Walker in March 2011, dramatically restricted the collective bargaining rights of municipal bargaining unit employees, except police and fire employees, and required those employees to pay portions of their retirement and health insurance benefits.  

On Friday, September 14, 2012, in a suit brought by Madison teachers and a union representing Milwaukee workers, Dane County Circuit Court Judge Juan Colas held major portions of the law unconstitutional.  Judge Colas found that Act 10 violates the school and local employees’ rights to free speech, free association, and equal representation because it, among other things, caps union workers' raises but not those of nonunion employees and because it treats police and fire employees differently than other public workers.

The situation in Wisconsin is still quite fluid.  While local public sector union leaders have pledged that they will immediately seek to bargain on a host of issues made off-limits to collective bargaining by Act 10, Wisconsin Attorney General J.B. Van Hollen has sought a stay of the ruling pending his appeal.  To further complicate matters, two challenges to the law are still pending in federal court.  The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals will hear oral arguments on September 24th in connection with appeal of a federal judge’s March ruling which struck down portions of the law.  Another federal case brought on very similar grounds to the case heard by Judge Colas, has not yet been decided.  

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Affordable Care Act Upheld

Posted on June 28, 2012 06:14 by Marc E. Williams

This morning the Supreme Court issued its long–awaited decision on the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. The Court upheld the most important feature of the act, the individual mandate, which requires that individuals not covered by health insurance buy coverage or face a “shared responsibility payment.” This mandate was critical to the success of the Act, since the availability of affordable coverage for the millions of uninsured Americans required a large pool of customers. In reviewing the authority of Congress to require this mandate, the Court found that it falls within the taxing power of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. The Court also noted that the individual mandate was not an appropriate exercise of Congressional power under the Commerce Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause. Writing for a plurality of justices, Chief Justice Roberts noted that the questions of the soundness of the policy is not an issue for the court to consider, but only to decide whether it is an appropriate exercise of Congressional authority. Ultimately the Court found that the mandate’s imposition of a penalty for failing to purchase insurance was not commerce that could be regulated by Congress, but would fall within its taxing power. In finding that the mandate was a tax, the Court adopted the position of the Solicitor General, and guaranteed that the issue will continue to resonate in political debates through the November election.


A separate part of the decision considered the constitutionality of a provision of the Act that expanded Medicaid coverage to millions of new individuals. As a result, states were required to adopt new eligibility requirements or risk losing all of its Medicaid funding. The coercive nature of this requirement was the critical feature of the review of this portion of the Act. A complicated plurality of justices held that the expansion was unconstitutionally coercive, but that the remedy for this violation is to strike down the provision allowing the federal government to withhold all Medicaid funds unless a state agrees to the expansion. Accordingly, states that do not agree to the expansion will only lose new Medicaid funding.

For a complete copy of the opinions, see this link: http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/11-393c3a2.pdf

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Trademark owners agonizing over internet search engine technology and their ability to protect their brand scan step back from the ledge, at least for the moment. The fact that their trademarks may serve important indexing or advertising functions for internet search engine companies, like Google or Bing, does not serve to immunize search engine providers from liability for trademark infringement. On Monday, April 9th, the Fourth Circuit breathed new life into Rosetta Stone’s trademark suit against Google, vacating in large part the Eastern District of Virginia’s 2010decision dismissing Rosetta Stone’s claims against Google on summary judgment. The Fourth Circuit remanded Rosetta Stone’s claims for direct trademark infringement, contributory infringement, and trademark dilution for further proceedings.


Rosetta Stone’s appeal to the Fourth Circuit was widely-followed, in part because of the district court’s novel application of the functionality doctrine to the search engine context. The district court concluded that the functionality doctrine protected Google’s use of Rosetta Stone’s marks as keyword triggers as a matter of law. According to the district court, keywords, including trademarks such as “Rosetta Stone,” serve an “essential indexing function” for Google, allowing it to readily identify websites or information relevant to an online user’s search query. The district court found that the use of such keywords also served an “advertising function” that provides consumers with “a highly useful means of searching the internet for products at competitive prices.” The online functions articulated by the district court would apply to virtually any (if not every) trademark imaginable, as trademarks are meant to identify products, brands, and suppliers. An order approving the district court’s functionality analysis would have had far-reaching implications. Where adopted, it would have effectively immunized internet search engine providers selling trademarks as keywords from trademark infringement liability.

The Fourth Circuit unequivocally rejected the district court’s reliance on the functionality doctrine.  It found it irrelevant whether Google’s search engine may function better through the use of trademarked keywords, such as Rosetta Stone’s marks. The relevant inquiry is not whether use of the mark makes Google’s product more useful or functional, but whether the mark itself or the trademark holder’s use of the mark is functional. According to the Fourth Circuit, there was clearly nothing functional about Rosetta Stone’s use of its mark. Rosetta Stone uses its mark as a classic source identifier for its products. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit explicitly rejected the functionality doctrine as a possible affirmative defense.

It remains to be seen whether Rosetta Stone will ultimately prevail in its claims against Google. Numerous key issues remain for trial, including Google’s intent, the extent of actual customer confusion, the sophistication of consumers of Rosetta Stone’s products, as well as the potential application of the nominative fair use defense. What is clear is that trademark owners are not yet relegated to actions solely against the infringing advertisers using internet search engines. Companies, such as Google, that provide the search engine services will remain key targets and their ability to rely upon functionality as a defense has taken a significant blow.

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As reported by Forbes, a U.S. District Court sanctioned a prominent U.S. law firmfor manufacturing a frivolous lawsuit.  The case is Lavesky et al. v. ITT Educational Services, Inc., filed under the False Claims Act (“FCA”).  The Lavesky court did not mince words in sanctioning plaintiff’s counsel: “From what the Court can gather, [plaintiff’s attorneys’] view is that virtually any ex-employee will do for purposes of manufacturing an FCA lawsuit.”  


Lavesky carries implications for all cases, not just those filed under the FCA--it provides a blueprint for the defendant victim of a manufactured lawsuit.  If discovery shows that the plaintiff was unaware of the facts upon which she based her lawsuit before an “enlightening conversation” with her attorney, the defendant should consider moving for sanctions pursuant to:(i) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, and (ii) Model Rule of Professional Conduct 7.3, which prohibits lawyers from soliciting “professional employment from a prospective client when a significant motive for the lawyer’s doing so is the lawyer’s pecuniary gain.”  This recipe ended up costing the Lavesky’s counsel almost $400,000 in fees.

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The smooth transition of NFL jersey production responsibilities from Reebok to Nike hit a snag this week with the filing of a lawsuit by Nike against its rival. Nike filed suit in federal court against Reebok over Reebok’s swift production of Tim Tebow-New York Jets jerseys after Tebow’s trade to the Jets. The trade announcement on March 21st left an extremely tight window of time for Reebok to capitalize on the deal before its contract with the NFL expires on April 1, 2012.  


While Reebok’s deal with the NFL is technically still in place until April 1, Nike alleges that the jerseys are not valid licensed merchandise as authentic jerseys require two license agreements – one with the NFL to use its marks and one with the NFLPA (National Football League Players Association) or the individual player to use a specific players name.  Nike has had an endorsement deal with Tebow in place since his graduation from the University of Florida in 2010.  In appears that in this case, Reebok does not have a deal with either the NFLPA or Tebow that would allow it to use his name on its jerseys.

With the April 3rd premier of Nike’s NFL jersey collection quickly approaching, Nike asserts that Reebok’s hastily produced Tebow-Jets jerseys will negatively impact the demand for new Tebow-Jets apparel that has been steadily growing since the trade was announced. Nike is seeking injunctive relief to stop the sales of the jerseys along with the compensatory and punitive damages.  While being first to market may earn Reebok a quick profit in this situation, if the Court decides in Nike’s favor, the quick move could end up being a costly one. 

On Friday, March 30, Reebok was ordered to stop producing the jerseys.

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Many people will not be shocked by the title of this post.  However, a new report issued by an advocacy group for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce was recently released that was entitled, “The Plaintiffs’ Bar Goes Digital, an Analysis of the Digital Marketing Efforts of Plaintiffs’ Attorneys and Litigation Firms.”  The report found that marketing efforts were being camouflaged as forums or support group sites.   The report estimated that law firms had spent more than $50,000,000 on Google advertising in 2011.  The overwhelming majority of that was spent by Plaintiff’s firms.  However, despite the fact that the amount of spending does not rank with large corporations, it is disproportionate for the size of the industry.  The report is critical of the Plaintiffs’ Bar because of a lack of transparency that many of their sites were actually marketing for law firms.  

As social networking, blogs, and other methods of disseminating information grow, they will become an increasingly prominent part of Plaintiff’s attorneys networking and marketing strategies.  To a lesser extent, we can expect the same on the defense side.  As we expand our internet marketing footprint, we need to be ever vigilant to ensure that our marketing is done truthfully and ethically.  Advertisement by legal professionals should be transparent and truthful.  Various bar associations will most likely weigh in on specific examples in the near future.  We should all make diligent efforts to make sure we are on the right side of whatever precedent is set.  

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Is Google Googling You?

Posted on March 9, 2012 01:40 by Chad Godwin

If you use the Google search engine (and I’m guessing that includes pretty much everyone) you may have noticed a text box appearing on the screen during the past couple weeks, imploring you to read Google’s new privacy disclosures, along with the caveat “this stuff matters.”  That text box stopped appearing on March 1, when Google introduced its new privacy policy.  According to Reuters, at the beginning of the year, Google began reporting that it was simplifying its privacy policy, consolidating 60 guidelines into a single policy that applies to all its services, including YouTube, Gmail and the social network Google+. 

According to the title of a Washington Post article, the “New privacy policy lets Google watch you – everywhere.”  More specifically, the new policy allows Google to track users’ activities by consolidating information it gathers on them across all of the company’s platforms.  Users cannot opt out of the new policy if they want to continue using Google’s services.  A company representative, Alma Whitten, noted that until now, the company has been restricted in their ability to combine YouTube search histories, for example, with other information on a user’s account (email activity).  Although the company claims that it does not sell or trade personally identifiable user information, it now shares usage habits and historical data across all platforms and uses the information to match ads to your online behavior .  Moreover, the fact that Google is gathering so much user specific information on individuals creates the potential for additional privacy implications in the future.  

The National Association of Attorneys General sent a letter to Google signed by 36 members expressing concern about the new policy.  In part, the letter noted:

Consumers have diverse interests and concerns, and may want the information in their Web history to be kept separate from the information they exchange via Gmail. Likewise, consumers may be comfortable with Google knowing their search queries but not with it knowing their whereabouts, yet the new privacy policy appears to give them no choice in the matter, further invading their privacy.

EU Justice Commissioner Viviane Reding stated that data protection agencies in European countries have concluded that Google’s new privacy policy is in breach of European law.  Given the amount of attention the new privacy policy has generated, it appears as though it’s only a matter of time before the company faces its first significant legal challenge to the policy.  Until then, the digital footprint of all internet users will undoubtedly continue to grow.

Chad Godwin

Attorney

Carr Allison


 


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