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Waiving Your Right to Arbitration: An Overview of Legal Actions That May Be Considered an Invocation of the Litigation Process and Result in Prejudice to the Opposing Party

Posted on: 7/19/2012
Alicia M. Harrison, Starnes Davis Florie
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Waiving Your Right to Arbitration: An Overview of Legal Actions That May Be Considered an Invocation of the Litigation Process and Result in Prejudice to the Opposing Party

If the resident of a nursing home you represent is required to sign an arbitration agreement upon their admission, chances are the nursing home will want to enforce the agreement if the resident files a lawsuit against it. In order to ensure the claims will be subject to arbitration, defendants must avoid undertaking activity that may later be viewed as a waiver of the right to arbitration. This article presents an overview of the law on waiver of arbitration in the Eleventh Circuit and Alabama, provides specific examples of activity that may constitute a waiver of the right to arbitration and/or result in prejudice to the opposing party, and provides tips for avoiding waiver.

Law on Waiver of Arbitration

In order to determine if a party waived its contractual right to arbitrate in the Eleventh Circuit, the court examines if, "'under the totality of the circumstances, the party has acted inconsistently with the arbitration right' and, in so acting, has in some way prejudiced the other party." See S & H Contractors, Inc. v. A.J. Taft Coal Co., 906 F.2d 1507, 1514 (11th Cir. 1990) (internal citations omitted). In Alabama, the party opposing arbitration must demonstrate both "(1) that the party seeking arbitration has substantially invoked the litigation process, bespeaking an intent to abandon arbitration in favor of the judicial process, and (2) that the party opposing arbitration would be 'substantially prejudiced' by an order requiring it to submit to arbitration." Aurora Healthcare, Inc. v. Ramsey, No. 1091561, 2011 WL 5009781, at * 4 (Ala. Oct. 21, 2011). The party opposing arbitration bears a heavy burden, because waiver of arbitration will not be "lightly inferred" due to the strong federal policy favoring arbitration. Mutual Assurance v. Wilson, 716 So. 2d 1160, 1164 (Ala. 1998).

Substantially Invoking the Litigation Process

There is no rigid test for determining whether a defendant has substantially invoked the litigation process. Each case will be decided on its own particular facts. See Jones–Williams Constr. Co. v. Town and Country Prop., LLC, 923 So. 2d 321, 323 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005). That being said, there are several affirmative actions defendants may take that likely will not be considered a waiver of the right to arbitration. For example, removing a case to federal court, standing alone, does not waive a party's right to compel arbitration. See Goff Group, Inc. v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1155 (M.D. Ala. 2002). Similarly, the mere filing of a motion to dismiss does not waive the right to arbitration. See Zedot Const., Inc. v. Red Sullivan's Conditioned Air Servs., Inc., 947 So. 2d 396, 401 (Ala. 2006). Filing a motion for a change of venue does not constitute a waiver either, as a defendant has the right to have the proper venue established before it has any obligation to move to compel arbitration. See Thompson v. Skipper Real Estate Co., 729 So. 2d 287, 292 (Ala. 1999). In fact, answering complaints on the merits, asserting a cross-claim or even participating in discovery, without more, will not constitute a waiver. See Voyager Life Ins. Co. v. Hughes, 841 So. 2d 1216, 1219–20 (Ala. 2001) (citations omitted).

Litigating a matter for many months and filing several pleadings and motions in the process, however, could result in a waiver of the right to arbitration. For example, in Paw Paw's Camper City, Inc. v. Hayman, 973 So. 2d 344 (Ala. 2007), Camper City answered the Haymans' complaint and asserted arbitration as an affirmative defense, but also asserted a counterclaim and demanded a jury trial. Thereafter, the Haymans served interrogatories and requests for production of documents, moved the trial court for sanctions when Camper City failed to respond, and deposed two Camper City employees. Camper City filed its own interrogatories and requests for production, and deposed the Haymans. During the depositions, both parties called upon the trial court numerous times to intercede and settle disputes. The Haymans requested a trial setting, and Camper City did not object. During discovery, Camper City never suggested that the claims were subject to resolution by arbitration. Approximately ten months after the Haymans filed their complaint, and just two months prior to the scheduled trial, Camper City filed a motion to compel arbitration and stay further discovery. The circuit court denied the motion and the grounds that Camper City had substantially invoked the litigation process. The Alabama Supreme Court agreed based on the fact that Camper City participated in full blown pre-trial discovery on all issues in the case, asked the court to intercede and settle disputes, and never mentioned to the court that any claim was subject to arbitration.

In certain limited circumstances, a defendant may be afforded a second chance to assert its right to arbitration. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals recently allowed a defendant to rescind its previous waiver of arbitration, despite litigating for nine months, where plaintiff's amended class action complaint set forth a new class definition. See Krinsk v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., 654 F.3d 1194, 1203 (11th Cir. 2011). The revised class definition "greatly broadened the potential scope" of the litigation "by opening the doors to thousands – if not tens of thousands – of new class plaintiffs not contemplated in the original class definition," and expanded the class period from "over three months to over three years." The Eleventh Circuit stated that the "vast augmentation of the putative class so altered the shape of litigation that, despite its prior invocations of the judicial process, SunTrust should have been allowed to rescind its waiver of its right to arbitration." Id. at 1204.

Substantial Prejudice

In determining whether a party has waived its right to arbitrate a case, courts also consider the prejudice that will result to the party opposing arbitration if a motion to compel arbitration is granted. The Alabama Supreme Court recently held that the defendants had not waived their right to arbitrate, despite the fact that they did not file their motion to compel arbitration until one year after the complaint was filed, because plaintiff failed to show that she would be substantially prejudiced by an order requiring her to arbitrate. See Aurora Healthcare, Inc. v. Ramsey, No. 1091561, 2011 WL 5009781, at * 5-*7 (Ala. Oct. 21, 2011).

On November 3, 2005, Sharon Ramsey, in her capacity as administratrix of Mary Pettway's estate, filed a wrongful death lawsuit in Wilcox County against a nursing home. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss or for a change of venue. The parties vigorously litigated the issue of venue, and the case was eventually transferred to the Jefferson County Circuit Court. Defendants filed an answer and did not assert its right to arbitration. One year after the initial complaint was filed, defendants filed a motion to compel arbitration, but continued actively litigating the case. Over four years after the complaint was filed, the circuit court entered an order denying defendants' motion to compel arbitration, stating that defendants substantially invoked the litigation process by continuing to file significant pleadings after the case was transferred and by participating in discovery. The circuit court also determined that Ramsey had been prejudiced by incurring significant attorney fees in participating in the litigation. Id. at *1-*2.

On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court examined only whether plaintiff would be prejudiced if the case were submitted to arbitration. The court considered whether plaintiff was forced to incur the type of expenses that arbitration was designed to alleviate. The court found that much of plaintiff's costs were incurred litigating the issue of venue, and held that incurring those costs did not constitute prejudice because a defendant has the right to have a proper venue established before it has any obligation to move to compel arbitration. Id. at *5. The court also considered whether the defendant "took advantage of judicial discovery procedures not available in arbitration." Id. The court consulted the Code of Procedure of the National Arbitration Forum, which was expressly incorporated into the arbitration agreement. The Code required arbitrating parties to exchange available documents in support of, or in opposition to, all claims. The court found that little, if any, discovery was conducted of the sort that suggests the defendants took advantage of judicial discovery procedures not available in arbitration. Id.

The court then examined the time spent on the matter by plaintiff's counsel. The record reflected that plaintiff's counsel spent much of his time after November 2006 opposing arbitration. The court held that "[e]xpenses incurred by the party opposing arbitration are not considered prejudicial." Id. at 5. The court placed substantial weight on the fact that plaintiff's opposition to arbitration presented only conclusory assertions that she had incurred litigation costs. Her motion was not accompanied by an affidavit or any other evidence in support of the allegation that she would be prejudiced by being compelled to arbitrate her claims. She did not allege how many hours her counsel had spent in litigation matters or the amount of fees or expenses incurred in such matters. The court held that Ramsey failed to establish that she was prejudiced by the defendants' "belated assertion of their arbitration right," because she failed to show resulting substantial prejudice. Id. at *7.

Tips for Avoiding Waiver

In conclusion, defendants should be wary of conducting any litigation activity that may arguably constitute a waiver of the right to arbitration. Defense counsel should:

1. Make efforts to locate any potential arbitration agreement the moment the file is assigned.

2. File a motion to compel arbitration with the answer if possible. If not possible, be sure to include an affirmative defense in the answer stating that the case may be subject to arbitration, and file the motion to compel arbitration as soon thereafter as possible.

3. Do not issue discovery or file notices of intent to issue subpoenas or notices of deposition if there is uncertainty whether an arbitration agreement exists.

4. If immediate discovery is necessary, consider entering into an agreement with opposing counsel which specifically states that the discovery being undertaken will not be considered an invocation of the litigation process.

5. Avoid engaging court involvement beyond that absolutely necessary (e.g., venue, arbitration) and object to any court involvement while simultaneously re-asserting the arbitration defense.

6. View the rules of the selected arbitration forum to determine what discovery is allowed. If there is a time lapse between the filing of the complaint and filing of the motion to compel arbitration, argue that the discovery conducted would have been allowed in the arbitration forum, and does not constitute an invocation of the litigation process or result in any substantial prejudice to the opposing party.

Alicia M. Harrison



Starnes Davis Florie LLP



Birmingham, Alabama



aharrison@starneslaw.com

 

 

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